Autori Tema: Arkivat sekrete të CIA-s: Marrëdhëniet e Jugosllavisë me Shqipërinë  (Lexuar 3511 herë)

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Në vitin 2006, CIA hapi arkivat sekrete që kishin lidhje me Jugosllavine. Ishin gjithsej 34 dokumenta, shumica analiza dhe memorandume të përgatitura nga specialiste të CIA për zhvillimet politike, ushtarake dhe ekonomike të Jugosllavisë. Dokumenti i parë mban datën 18 Nentor 1948, kurse dokumenti i fundit është shkruar në vitin 1990. Për të apasionuarit e historise së Ballkanit dokumentat në fjalë janë një thesar i vertetë.

Marrëdhëniet e Jugosllavisë me Shqipërine zënë një vend të rëndësishëm në analizat e CIA, madje dokumenti me titull “Yugoslav Intentions toward Albania” i shkruar ne Tetorë të vitit 1952 bën nje përshkrim tejet të detajuar për qëllimet Jugosllave dhe situaten politike në Shqiperi.

Dokumentat tregojnë qartë se për mire apo për keq pavarësia e Shqiperise gjatë Luftes se Ftohte ka qënë e lidhur ngushtë me fatin e regjimit e Hoxhës, dhe se Jugosllavia ka luajtur një rol tejet të fuqishem në izolimin e Shqiperise. Më poshte mund të lexoni pasazhet që kane lidhje me Shqiperinë. 


Estimate of the Yougoslav Regime’s Ability to Resist Soviet Pressure During 1949

1.     Military

Tito would take vigorous counter-measures to prevent the develoopment of a war of attrition with its potentially fatal consequences to his regime. In such an iventuality, those measures would probably involve Yougoslav-sponsored guerrilla action in Albania and Bulgaria, which would create serious difficulties for the regimes of those two countries, especially the insicure Hoxha Government in Albania.

Evaluation of Soviet-Yougoslav Relations (1950), 11 May 1950

1.  Titoist Yougoslavia as a Threat to the USSR.

So long as Yougoslavia remains beyond Soviet control, Albania is rendered less secure, while present prospects for a renewal of the Greek war are remote.

2.  Soviet capabilities and intentions.

According to numerous reports from the countries bordering Yougoslavia, a limited traffic in agents across the Yougslav frontiers has existed for some time. A number of camps for the training of Cominform partisan specialists have been identified in Hungary, Roumania, Bulgaria and Albania.

The Current Situation in Yugoslavia, 21 November 1950

18. The US diplomatic mission in Belgrade represents the one US post in southeastern Europe where few restrictions are now imposed and travel is relatively unhampered. Consequently, Belgrade is a potential center for US intelligence reporting for the whole area. In addition, Yugoslavia’s defection from the Soviet bloc has heightened the geographical isolation of Albania and increased the pressure on the Hoxha government. If Albania is eventually forced out of the Soviet bloc, the way would obviously be opened for the formation of anti-Soviet bloc composed of Turkey, Greece, Albania, Yugoslavia, and possibly Austria or Italy. The presence in Yugoslavia of large numbers of Albanians, Macedonians, Hungarians, and Rumanians affords the Yugoslavs a large potential for the waging of political warfare in the Balkans. Subversion, sabotage, guerrilla warfare, and propaganda are all within the range of accomplishment of these groups.

Probability of an invasion of Yugoslavia in 1951, 20 March 1951

20. The combined armies of Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, and Albania, if given central direction and full logistical support by the USSR, could mount a sustained invasion of Yugoslavia which would force the Yugoslav Army back into the mountainous regions of Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Montenegro.

Cominform propaganda since July 1950 has consistently alleged that Yugoslavia intends to attack Albania and Bulgaria.

Yugoslav Intentions toward Albania.

1.     The conclusions of NIE-42 pertinent to the present problems are as follows:

a.     Resistance activity within Albania, while a troublesome problem for the Hoxha regime, was not an immediate threat.

b.     So long as the resistance effort in Albania remained divided and did not receive substantial external aid, the Albanian security forces could probably contain it.

c.      Yugoslavia, Italy and Greece had conflicting interests in Albania, and each probably preferred the status quo to a change favorable to the others.

2.     Recent reports indicate that resistance activity in Albania has increased, in part as a result of increased activity by émigré elements. Albanian Government leaders have shown concern over the increase of Yugoslav and other propaganda against the regime. At the middle and lower levels of the party and government, including the security organs, a loss of confidence in the long-term prospects of the regime and an increased sense of personal insecurity appear to have developed.

3.     The Yugoslavs, in addition to supporting an increased tempo of activity by Albanian émigrés based in Yugoslavia, have also been making contacts with Albanian émigré groups in other countries and with anti-Hoxha elements within Albania. Despite official denials, rumors circulate to the effect that the Yugoslavs are preparing to support a forceful overthrow of the Hoxha regime.

4.     Even if the Yugoslavs should succeed in uniting the various Albanian émigré factions, we do not believe that the émigrés could succeed in overthrowing the Hoxha regime without significant defections in the Albanian Government, army, and security forces. At present those forces, though not entirely trustworthy, are under the control of trusted officials, many of whom were trained in the USSR. We believe that these forces would revolt only if they became convinced that an insurrection (a) would receive sufficient aid from the outside to ensure success, (b) would not result in Yugoslav, Greek, or Italian domination and, (c) would lead to an independent Albania actively supported by the Western Powers. At present Yugoslav agents are reportedly attempting to convince Albanian defectors that aid would be forthcoming and that the US is supporting the Yugoslav activities. So far, however, the Yugoslavs have met with little success in creating the conditions perquisite to a Yugoslav-sponsored revolution in Albania.

5.     The Yugoslavs could overthrow the Hoxha regime if they utilized their own forces or large numbers of Kosovars (an Albanian minority in Yugoslavia) for operations in Albania. Even if only Kosovars were used, the Yugoslavs almost certainly estimate that intervention on such a scale would be identified as Yugoslav-supported. The Yugoslavs may estimate that their importance to the West is such that identifiable Yugoslav intervention in Albania would not result in the loss of Western support. However, the Yugoslav leaders probably estimate that identifiable intervention would adversely affect their present favorable relations with the Western Powers, would complicate Yugoslavia’s relations with her non-communist neighbors, and might provoke Soviet or Satellite relation.

6.     On the other hand, there are advantages for the Yugoslavs in continuing their political pressure against the Albanian regime without directly intervening or deliberately precipitating a coup attempt. By continuing their present course they can promote the predominance of the Yugoslav-supported group within the Albanian émigré movement. They can undermine order and stability in Albania without serious risk of international complications, while developing contacts with disaffected elements within the Albanian regime. If successful in these efforts, they will have placed themselves in a favorite position to exploit any opportunity for intervention or to exercise preponderant influence in any new regime.

7.     The Yugoslavs would almost certainly seize upon any opportunity to establish a pro-Yugoslav regime in Albania if it could be done without incurring serious risk of provoking Western disfavor or Soviet retaliation. We believe, however, that for the present they will continue to expert political pressure against the Albanian regime without directly intervening or deliberately precipitating a coup attempt.

Probable Developments in Yugoslavia, 26 June 1953

11. We believe that the Yugoslavs have not present intention of precipitating a coup against the Hoxha regime. They probably calculate that to do so would create serious risks of provoking Western disfavor and Soviet retaliation. They probably would stage a coup, if they thought it could be done without incurring these risks; they might therefore be willing to cooperate with other powers in a coup attempt at some future date. However, Yugoslavia’s cooperation probably would be contingent upon sufficient Yugoslav control over the method and nature of the coup attempt to minimize the dangers to Yugoslavia and upon a belief that Yugoslavia could eventually dominate the new Albanian regime.

Yugoslavia and its Future Orientations, 23 February 1955

Yugoslav leaders almost certainly desire to have an Albanian regime responsive to their influence if not under their direct control, despite their public proclamation of interest in having Albania free and independent. To this end, they will continue to support certain Albanian émigré and resistance elements, will endeavor to neutralize the efforts of such powers as Italy, Greece, the UK, and US to built up similar influence, and will oppose any Western proposals which might prejudice Yugoslav ambitions, particularly those involving partition of Albania or the establishment of a non-Communist regime there. However, Yugoslavia will probably soft-pedal its propaganda efforts to undermine the present Albanian regime so long as the “normalization” policy appears to be producing favorable results. Moreover, it is unlikely to undertake unilaterally any major intervention in Albania, except in the event of a serious governmental crisis in that country, for fear of arousing strong Greek, Italian, US, and UK opposition.

Yugoslavia’s Policies and Prospects, 11 June 1957                       

26. By April 1957 Belgrade’s relations with most of the East European states were at their lowest point since the post-Stalin raprochement began in 1954. In one respect Albania went even further than in the 1948-1952 period by hinting at irredentist claims on Yugoslavia’s Albanian-populated territory.

Outlook for Yugoslavia, 23 May 1961

The leaders of Albania, whose party was once virtually a satellite of the Yugoslav Party, felt themselves gravely threatened by Khrushchev’sefforts toward rapprochement with Tito,which began in 1955. Fearing a revival of this policy, they have found common cause with the Chinese. During the Sino-Soviet dispute in 1960 they openly sided with Peiping against Moscow and relations with the latter have steadily deteriorated. Tirana’s relation with Belgrade, normally bad, have recently worsened to the point where severance of diplomatic relations could occur at any time. As a result, the Albanian leaders show anxiety about the possibility that the Soviets and the Yugoslavs will conspire against Albania (perhaps with the help of the Greeks). Soviet moves to improve relations with Belgrade – such as prospective visit of the Yugoslav Foreign Minister to Moscow – are thus viewed by Tirana as part of a deliberate plot to unseat the Albania regime.


Authority and Control in the Communist Movement, 8 August 1961

The performance of all the Eastern European Communists at the Moscow Conference, except the Albanians, was thoroughly obedient.

30. Albania however turned out to be a dramatically different case. The Albanian Party is in the hands of unreconstructed Stalinists who are obsessed with the fear that Yugoslavia will re-establish its former tutelage over the Albanian Communist movement. Accordingly, this leadership was gravely alarmed when, in 1955 and 1956, Khrushchev launched his attack upon Stalin, including in the indictment Stalin’s attempts to subvert Yugoslavia, and took up the cultivation of Tito. Even after the post-Hungarian hardening of soviet policy, the Albanians continued to see a threat to their independence in Khrushchev’s advocacy of ‘peaceful coexistence” and his reluctance to accede to an all-out on Tito. Thus when the Chinese appeared as the champions of a hard antirevisionist line, Albania broke ranks and during meetings of the Communist Parties in 1960, openly joined the Chinese side with virulent attacks upon the CPSU.

31. Chinese support offers some protection for the Albanians, since the USSR must recognize that direct moves against Tirana risk further worsening of its already delicate relations with Peiping. The Albanians enjoy two other advantages, however, which are probably more important in their defense of their new anti-Soviet stance. One is their physical separation from the Bloc, which makes it difficult for the USSR to apply physical force without greatly damaging its international position. The other is the unity of the Albanian top leadership dating form wartime partisan combat and secured by a series of purges which cleansed it first of members sympathetic to its former mentor, the Yugoslav Party, and then, in 1960, of pro-Soviet elements. As a result, the Soviets have had to restrict themselves to indirect methods which thus far have proven embarrassingly ineffectual. Moscow’s failure to punish the defiance of another Communist state is especially ignominious in view of Albania’s size and hitherto complete subordination.   

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